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ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether manipulation of a private third party by a
law enforcement officer to procure the commission of
a criminal offense by another renders the third party
a government agent for purposes of the entrapment defense
even though the third party remains unaware of the law
enforcement object.

Whether Appellant as a matter of law was entrapped by
authorities, through his friend, Toby Wells, into
committing the offense in question and whether, on that
account, this Court should reverse the jury verdict and
acquit the Appellant of the crime charged.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20490

JERRY L. MARTIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 28th day of November, 1984, defendant/appellant,
Jerry L. Martin, was convicted of the offense of Unlawful
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance after a jury
trial was had on the charges.

Defendant was sentenced on the

14th day of January by the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Third District
Court Judge.

Thereafter, Martin filed a Notice of Appeal on

February 8, 1985, as well as a Docketing Statement.

For purposes

of this appeal, Jerry L. Martin, defendant/appellant will be
referred to as Martin.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant petitions this Court to overturn the
Jury Verdict and rule as a matter of law that Martin is not
guilty, by way of entrapment, and also that this Court judicially
recognize that the defense of entrapment does apply where the
government uses a private individual, even though the individual
is not aware of it, as an agent or accessory for entrapping a
third party, i.e., Martin.

Therefore, this Court should reverse

the Minute Entry Order of April 27, 1984, which denied Appellant
the right to assert the defense of entrapment and should rule
that the Appellant here was entrapped as a matter of law and fact.
FACTS
Toby Wells (hereinafter referred to as Wells) and
Defendant/Appellant Jerry Martin (hereinafter referred to as
Martin) were friends prior to the times in question and used
to double-date quite often (T.145,L.1-3).

In the past Martin

had loaned Wells money to pay rent, buy gas, and on occasion
Wells had lent Martin money (T.145, L.6-8).

Further, Wells

admitted that prior to the times in question he had been at
Martin's house several times, that Martin had been at his house
several times and that their wives were very close friends and,
in fact, that Martin had loaned money to Well's wife. (T.96).
In about August 1982, or October 1982, depending upon
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whose story is believed, Wells was introduced to Charles Hafen,
a West Valley City police officer with narcotics investigation
division (hereafter referred to as Hafen) by an undercover
officer, Barbara Mann, who had become a girlfriend of Wells
who referred to Hafen as her brother (T.49,L.24; T.99, L.7).
From the point where Hafen met Wells, it is best to
let the parties tell their won story by summarizing their
testimony as brought at trial.
Hafen testified as to the facts as follows:
Charlie Hafen, a police officer for West Valley, Utah,
stated that when he first met Toby Wells he (Hafen) was not
sure who first brought up the question of cocaine (T.p.20, L.16).
Then a little later Hafen admitted that it was he (Hafen) who
first proposed to Toby Wells that he wanted to find some cocaine,
"to basically go into the cocaine trade with.1' "So it was me
that first spoke to Toby about it." (T.p.21, LL.3-6).
T.p.22, LL. 17-20:
"Q.

Did you make any arrangements with Toby
as to what his part would be in the deal?

A.

It was basically agreed that he was to arrange
the sale, be sure that it was quality- cocaine.

Hafen stated that he was going to pay Toby Wells for
setting up the deal, by giving him "an ounce" of cocaine. (T.
p.22, L.24).

On or about October 18, 1982, Hafen bought 1 gram
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of cocaine from Wells ( T . 4 9 , L . 1 9 ) .

Hafen admitted t h a t on the

18th of October, 1982, at t h e time of the a l l e g e d f i r s t buy of
an ounce of c o c a i n e , he (Hafen) showed Wells about $16,000.00
in cash.(T.23, LL.14-15).
Hafen s t a t e d t h a t he t o l d Wells t h a t he had $35,000.00
and that he had g o t t e n i t from "doing grocery s t o r e and bank
robberies i n the Intermountain a r e a . " ( T . 2 7 , L L . 7 - 8 ) .
Hafen further s t a t e d t h a t he spoke with Wells about
e i g h t or n i n e times on the telephone between the 6th and 27th
of October, 1982. (T.50,LL.12-13) and t h a t he saw Wells i n person
on the 6 t h , the day of the 18th, the afternoon of the 18th and
on the 27th (T.50,LL.16-17) and t h a t the informant, Barbara Mann,
may a l s o have t a l k e d w i t h him ( T . 5 0 , L L . 2 0 - 2 1 ) .
Hafen admitted t h a t on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s he t o l d Wells
t h a t he was out of S t a t e (T.52,LL.15-17) and t h a t he did not
remember i n which calls he s a i d t h a t ( T . 5 2 , LL 1 0 - 1 4 ) .
"A.

I am not sure i f I can remember.

There were so

many c a l l s t h a t we made, some of them j u s t
b a s i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h i n g a somewhat f r i e n d l y
working r e l a t i o n s h i p .

I am not sure i f I r e -

c a l l e x a c t l y when I s a i d I was i n S t a t e and
out of S t a t e . "
Hafen s t a t e d he maybe spoke w i t h Wells ten or twelve times by
phone.

(T.52,LL.22-23).
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At the time Hafen bought the gram of cocaine from
Toby Wells, he admitted showing him either $15,000 or $16,000.
(T.57,LL.l-2).

Hafen stated that at the time he (Hafen) bought

the gram from Wells, he gave Wells the option of having one
ounce of cocaine or the sum of $2,000 to $2,500.00.(T.57,LL.
14-18).

Hafen stated he didn't know what representations Wells

made to Jerry Martin or how many times Wells called Martin.
(T.60, L.3; T.60, L.10).
Toby Wells' testimony can be outlined as follows:
Toby Wells said that he became acquainted with Hafen
prior to October 6, 1982, and that he (Wells) remembers it as
being in August, 1982.(T.97,L.6,L.13).
Wells stated that Mr. Hafen had talked with him on
the night that he had first met him and that Hafen had told
Wells that he (Hafen) "was from Denver" and that he was "trying
to break away from some dealings in there and starting his own
here in Salt Lake." (T.100,LL.19-21).
Wells stated that he met with Hafen several days
later at the Main Event (T.101,LL.6-8), and that around that
time Hafen "was always calling, leaving messages, if I wasn't
at work, at my mother's".(T.102,LL7-8) and that on the phone
Hafen first asked Wells about purchasing a gram for Hafen (T.
102,LL.9-15), and that this gram was to be just a sample,
(t.102,LL.18-23).
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Wells stated that he contacted Jerry Martin among
other people around that time, but Jerry Martin didn't contact
him (Wells) back. (T.103,104 LL.1-2).

Wells further stated

that Hafen was "constantly calling11. (T.104,L.18) and that
he told Hafen that he (Wells) could not do anything because
he didn't have the money.

Hafen then gave Wells $140.00 to

purchase Hafen a gram of cocaine.(T.105,L.2) which Wells did,
but not from Martin.(T.105,LL.2-6).
About the same time as the purchase of the gram of
cocaine, Hafen showed Wells a bag containing $12,000.00.(T.105,
LL.15-17).

Wells stated that Hafen had shown him this same

amount on at least one prior occasion (T.107,LL.4-5).
Sometime later, Hafen told Wells that he was leaving
town for several weeks and that he would contact Wells (T.108,
LL.14-16) which he did, stating that he (Hafen) "was collecting
the money from people that owe him money" (T.108,LL.20-21) and
that Hafen now wanted to get a pound (T.108,L.25).
Wells stated that shortly after these conversations
he called Jerty Martin again and told Martin that Hafen was
out of town collecting money.

But again Martin told Wells "no."

Wells kept asking Martin and finally Martin said that "he would
look and see."(T.109,L.13).
Wells received some more calls from Hafen, this time
with Hafen stating that he was calling "from California."(T.110,
L.6).
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Wells testified that he then called Martin again
and told him that they had some money and they wanted a pound.
(T.110,LL.23-24).
Wells testified further that shortly thereafter, Hafen
said that he was back in town and showed Wells $35,000.00 in
cash.

Wells stated that he contacted Martin but, "Jerry said

that he was very hesitant."(T.Ill,LL.19-25). Martin said, "No,
I will check and see what I can do.M(T.112,6-7); and then Martin
did not call Wells back.(T.112,LL.8-9). Wells contacted Martin
again the next evening and then called Martin again later.(T.113).
Even when Hafen finally went out to Martin's house,
according to Wells1 testimony, Jerry Martin still stated, ffNo,
I don't feel like I want to do this." (T.115,LL.20-21). According to Wells, Hafen shoved the money into Martin's face and
said, "No, we went through all this trouble.

You are not going

to back out now."(T.115,LL.23-24), and Hafen grabbed Martin as
Martin started walking away and swung him around.(T.116,LL.1-2).
Wells stated that from August to October 27, 1982,
Hafen saw Wells personally more than ten times.(T.117,L.23)

an

^

that there were countless telephone calls, sometimes three or
four a day. (T.118,LL.2-3) , and that Hafen told him he would
give him (Wells) $2,500.00 and some of the cocaine following
up the buy. (T.118,LL.9^16).

Hafen instructed Wells as to

what to tell his source, that he (Wells) had seen the $12,000.00
and how much cocaine Hafen wanted to buy.(T.119-120).
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The appellant's testimony was somewhat along the
lines of the testimony of Wells.

Martin, the appellant, stated

that he was a roofer earning about $14,000 annually, and that
he earned another $4,000 annually farming ten acres for his
86 year old father and 83 year old mother.(T.143-144).
Martin stated that when Wells was attempting to purchase an ounce of cocaine that Wells asked him, but that he
never did try because he did not intend to do it (T.147,LL.12-19),
and that later Wells began calling him, sometimes "every other
day, sometimes every day11, during the two-three month period
in question (T.148,LL.4-6), and that Wells later said that the
people have more money, and that Wells now wanted Martin to
obtain a quarter or three-quarters of a pound of cocaine.(T.148,
LL.10-12).

Martin still did not call Wells back.(T.148,LL.19-20).
Again, Wells began his persistent calling of Martin,

mentioning now a sum of $12,000.00 and Martin states that he
did this

!f

quite often for a weekM (T. 148,L. 25) . Thereafter,

Wells visited Martin in person, saying that "they wanted a pound"
and have $30,000.00 (T.149,LL.9-12).

Martin finally contacted

a man known as Chip (Doug Pexton) (T.157), whom Martin had met
playing pool.

Chip said that he would probably get Martin a

pound of cocaine for $20,000.00 (T.150).

Martin still did not

contact Wells, but Wells called Martin again and stated that
they have $35,000.00.(T.151). Martin then called Chip who took
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a pound of cocaine to Martin's and told Martin that he had
better have the money to him the next day or something might
happen to his home or his family.(T.152).
When Hafen arrived that evening (about October 28,
1982), Martin told him that he had told Toby Wells that he
"wasn't going to do it". (T.153,LL9-10;LL.13-15). Hafen
grabbed him (Martin) and pulled him around and said that he
had gone to a lot of trouble to put this deal together and
that Martin was "not going to punk out on me nox*." (T.153,
LL.17-20).

When Hafen grabbed him and pulled him around, he

felt a solid object in Hafen1s pocket which he assumed to be
a gun.(T.153,LL.21-25), and that he (Martin) fearfully went
ahead with the transaction.
Martin estimated that during the entire two-three
month period in question, he received over fifty telephone
calls from Wells, almost daily and sometimes twice a day, but
that during this time he "never called Toby once", and that
Wells also came out to his house three or four times. (T.155,
LL.9-17).
After a jury trial, Martin was found guilty of
Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance,
on November 28, 1984.

On January 14, 1985, Martin was sen-

tenced to a term in the Utah State Prison for a period of
"not less than one year nor more than fifteen years."
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant Martin's argument for purposes of this
appeal is briefly as follows:
Appellant will show that Toby Wells, due to his
manipulation by law enforcement officers was made a government
agent, albeit an unknowing one, for purposes of entrapping
Appellant Martin.
That as a matter of law, as developed in Utah,
the Appellant was entrapped, and that this entrapment constitutes grounds for this Court to overturn the jury verdict and
to acquit Appellant without the necessity of a new trial.
POINT ONE
APPELLANT REQUESTS THE SUPREME COURT TO ADOPT
THE RULE THAT, AS HERE, MANIPULATION OF A THIRD
PARTY BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO PROCURE
THE COMMISSION OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE BY ANOTHER
RENDERS THE THIRD PARTY A GOVERNMENT AGENT FOR
PURPOSES OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE EVEN THOUGH
THE THIRD PARTY REMAINS UNAWARE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OBJECT.
The California position is that one can be manipulated
by a government officer and thereby become an agent of the
government for purposes of entrapment, even though such person
is unaware that the one with whom he is dealing is a government
officer.
In the case of People v. Moran, 463 P.2d. 763, 766
(Cal.,EnBank,1970) the Court intimated that it was leaning
toward this view with regard to entrapment.

"The trial Court properly instructed
the jury that if the crime was suggested
by another person, whether or not a law
enforcement officer, for the purpose of
entranment the defendant is not liable.11
The seminal case, however, was that of People v.
Mclntire, 591 P.2d.527 (Cal. 1979).

In Mclntire, an undercover

police officer, through repeated entreaties and otherwise, persuaded a high-school youth from a troubled family to persuade
his sister to obtain some marijuana for him.

The Court there

concluded that the brother was an unknowing agent of the police
for purpose of his sister asserting an entrapment defense.
There was substantial evidence from which
the jury could have concluded that defendant was not involved in drug traffic and
never had been; that she did not want to
participate in the transaction herein, but
acquiesced after constant urging by her
younger brother because of sympathy aroused
by family problems; and that the importuning from her brother was the direct result
of strong and persistent pressure brought
to bear by an undercover police agent.
Such police conduct -- manipulating an impressionable high school youth from a
troubled family and using him to pressure
his sister into committing a crime she was
neither predisposed to nor desired to
commit — constitutes precisely the sort
of improper fostering of crime the entrapment
defense is intended to prevent.
The trial court apparently accepted the
prosecution claim that entrapment cannot be
effected through an unwitting agent; because
defendant's brother was not aware that the
person importuning him to obtain marijuana
from his sister was a police officer, the
pressure he applied in turn to defendant was
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not for the purpose of entraping her and
and the defense was therefore unavailable.
If such were the law, unconscionable law
enforcement activity would be permitted
so long as the target of entrapping agents
was not reached directly but indirectly
through the use of unsuspecting dupes.
Nothing in the doctrine of entrapment requires us to allow by indirection such an
irrational and dysfunctional result.
The purposes of the entrapment defense can
be fulfilled only if it is understood that
one can act as the agent of a law enforcement official without realizing the identity
of his principal; the unwitting agent,
though he may not appreciate the true nature
of his role, is nonetheless being manipulated as the officer's tool in a plan to foster
a crime and entrap its perpetrator. In
Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners (1973),
9 Cal.3d 356,364 107 Cal.Rptr. 473,478-79,
508 P.2d 1121, 1126-27, we recognize that
"The function of . . . enforcement officials
to investigate, not instigate, crime; to
discover, not to promote, crime.11 Improper
governmental instigation of crime is not
immunized because it is effected indirectly
through a pliable medium.
Case law from other jurisdictions supports
our conclusion that manipulation of a third
party by law enforcement officers to procure
the commission of a criminal offense by
another renders the third party a government
agent for purposes of the entrapment defense,
even though the third party remains unaware
of the law enforcement object. As one commentator has observed, "Despite his lack of
intent to secure the defendant's arrest, his
agency in such a situation seems apparent."
(Note, Entrapment (1960) 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1333,
1342.) Thus, in United States v. Klosterman
(3d Cir.1951) 248 P.2d 191,195-196, the court
reversed the conviction of one defendant,
Stafford, because his codefendant, Deeney,
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had induced him to commit the offense at
the urging of a law enforcement officer,
King: "Deeney became King's agent for
the purpose of entrapping Stafford." (Id.
at p.196; see also United States v. Mathues
E.D.Pa.1927) 22 F.2d 979; Johnson v. United
States (1963), 115 U.S.App.D.C. 63,64-65,
317 F.2d 127,128-129; id. 115U.S.App.D.C.
at p.69, 317 F.2d at p. 133 (dis.opn. by
Bastian, J.).)
_ld>
&t
53Q
The Utah law on the defense of entrapment, Ut.
C.Ann., 76-2-303, 1953, as amended, does not particularly
discuss instances such as that in Mclntire (supra), but the
language of the statute is broad enough that it should encompass such.

Ut.C.Ann. 76-2-303(1) states:
76-2-303. Entrapment. - (1) It is a
defense that the actor was entrapped into
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs
when a law enforcement officer or a person
Hirected by or acting in co-operation with
the officer induces the commission of an
offense in order to obtain evidence of the
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would
be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does
not constitute entrapment. (Emphasis added)

The statute goes on to provide, Ut.C.Ann. 76-2-303 (4)&(5):
04) Upon written motion of the defendant,
the court shall hear evidence on the issue
and shall determine as a matter of fact and
law whether the defendant was entrapped to
commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall
be made at least ten days before trial except
the court for good cause shown may permit a
later filing.
(5)

Should the court determine that the
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defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss
the case with prejudice, but if the court
determines the defendant was not entrapped,
such issue may be presented by the defendant
to the jury at trial. Any order by the
court dismissing a case based on entrapment
shall be appealable by the state.1'
In the instant case, appellant's then attorney, Galen
Ross, filed a Motion to Suppress, at least ten days prior to
the trial and a hearing on it was held on or about the 27th day
of April, 1984, before Judge Homer Wilkinson, a Judge of the
Third District Court.

On April 27, 1984, the Court, in a

Minute Entry, denied the defendant-appellantfs Motion.
Appellant urges this Court to rule as a matter of law
that appellant Martin's close friend had become an agent of the
State for purposes of entrapment and, further, that this Court
review the facts as set out in the record and rule as a matter
of law and fact that entrapment occurred here, thus reversing
the Minute Entry of April 27, 1984.
POINT TWO
BASED ON A STUDY OF THE UTAH LAW OF ENTRAPMENT
AND THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT
APPELLANT WAS ENTRAPPED BY HIS FRIEND, TOBY TOLLS
WHO WAS A DEFACTO POLICE AGENT, INTO COMMITTING
THE OFFENSE IN QUESTION; AND, THEREFORE,
THIS COURT OUGHT TO REVERSE THE JURY VERDICT
HERE AND ACQUIT THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
Prior to 1979, this Court adopted a subjective test
for purpose of determining the issue of entrapment.
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In State v.

Taylor, 599 P.2d. 496 (Ut.1979) this Court change

its position

and said that in conformity with the Utah Code provisions on
entrapment, which were adopted from the Model Penal Code, it
was clear that this Court should apply an objective test to fact
situations.

In Taylor, at 503, it then states the method for

applying an objective test:
"In assessing police conduct under the
objective standard, the test to determine
an unlawful entrapment is whether a law
enforcement official or an agent, in order
to obtain evidence of the commission, induced the defendant to commit such an
offense by persuasion or inducement which
would be effective to persuade an average
person, other than one who was merely given
the opportunity to commit the offense.
Extreme pleas of desparate illness or
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity,
or close personal friendship, or offers of
inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances
in each case of what might constitute prohibited conduct.11
Taylor, cites with approval the United States Supreme Court case
of Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed.
413 (1932).

In Sorrells, 77 L.Ed. 413, at 416-417, the Court

stated:
It is well settled that the fact that
officers or employees of the Government
merely afford opportunities or facilities
for the commission of the offense does not
defeat the prosecution. Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those
engaged in criminal enterprises.
(Extensive Citations). The appropriate
object of this permitted activity, frequently
essential to the enforcement of the law, is

- 15 -

to reveal the criminal design; to expose
the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails,
the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses,
and thus disclose the would-be violators
of the law. A different question is
presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the
alleged offense and induce its commission
in order that they may prosecute.tf
In State v. Taylor, supra, the Court found as a matter
of law there was entrapment where defendant and an undercover
police officer were very close friends (cohabitating at one
point) and where the undercover agent used that friendship to
induce defendant to make a final buy of heroin for her, for
which defendant was convicted.
In the two recent cases of State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d.
1238 (Ut.1980), and State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d. 404 (Ut. 1984),
this Court reversed convictions of Distribution of a Controlled
Substance for Value, where many

less contacts were made with

the defendants than were made by officer Hafen through his intermediary Toby Wells with appellant Jerry Martin.
In State v. Kourbelas, supra, the undercover officer
contacted the defendant, once in person, callad defendant about
two weeks later (which call defendant did not return), called
defendant two more times, thereby arranging the buy.

The Court,

in reversing the conviction, stated, at 1240:
f!

These facts are significant: that it
was Mr. Nelson who first suggested the purchase of marijuana from the defendant; that
after two weeks had passed it was he who

renewed the contact and the request, which
he followed up by calling the defendant at
least five times in attempting to purchase
the marijuana. This is to be considered
together with the fact that there is no
evidence that the defendant had previously
possessed or dealt in the drug ...
"It is our opinion that, if the rule as
to the presumption of innocence is fairly
and properly applied, there necessarily
exists a reasonable doubt as to whether the
offense committed was the product of the
defendant's initiative and desire, or was
induced by the persistent requests of Mr.
Nelson. Accordingly, it is our conclusion
that the defendant's convistion should be
reversed.11
In State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d.404 (Ut.1984) this
Court also reversed a conviction for Distribution of a Controlled
Substance for Value.

In the Sprague case, the undercover officer

merely approached the defendant on three occasions in person asking defendant if he could obtain some marijuana for the officer.
The undercover officer initiated the conversation on the first
occasion and took the initiative in making the contacts on the
next two occasions.

The Court reversed on the issue of entrap-

ment, and in its decision stated:
"Defendant relies on State v. Kourbelas,
in arguing that he was entrapped. That reliance is well-placed. In Kourbelas, on facts
markedly similar to those in this case, the
Court said that there existed 'a reasonable
doubt as to whether the offense committed was
the product of the defendant's initiative and
desire, or was induced by the persistent requests of (the undercover agent).'
"That language applies in this case as well.
It was Tauffer who first approached defendant,
with no reason to believe that defendant used
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or sold drugs. After a week had passed,
it was again Tauffer who approached defendant with the request f<?r marijuana,
which defendant did not provide. Finally,
after Tauffer approached defendant a third
time, defendant provided a gram of marijuana
to Tauffer. Defendant testified that he did
this because he wanted to be a friend to
Tauffer."
"Therefore, we conclude that the offense
was induced by the persistent requests of
Tauffer, not by the initiative and desire of
defendant.ff
In the instant case, the fact situation is even more
extreme than that of either the Sprague or Kourbelas cases
discussed above.

Here, the undercover narcotic agent, Hafen,

had made repeated in-person contact as well as anywhere from
20 to 50 or more telephone calls to Wells who, in turn, persistant ly contacted Appellant Martin, at times even twice a day,
for a period of two months.

Further, Hafen raised the amount

for the buy from $12,000, to $20,000, to $30,000, and finally,
to $35,000.

Prior to the amounts of $30,000 and $35,000 being

discussed, Martin, the Appellant, did not show interest in
arranging a cocaine buy, nor did he bother to contact Wells back
even though Wells was a friend of both Appellant and his wife.
In State v. Taylor, supra, this Court stated that two of the
indices which would tend to indicate entrapment are personal
friendship and offers of large sums of money, both of which
were factors here.
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H e r e , A p p e l l a n t r e q u e s t s t h i s Court t o f o l l o w t h e
view i n t h e M c l n t i r e c a s e , s u p r a , which h e l d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l
can become an agent f o r p u r p o s e s of entrapment where he i s
m a n i p u l a t e d by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r ,
unaware of s u c h .

even where t h e i n d i v i d u a l

is

T h i s case i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e language of

U t a h ' s e n t r a p m e n t s t a t u t e , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d ,

§76-2-303.

A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t Toby Wells was an agent of
t h e n a r c o t i c d i v i s i o n and O f f i c e r Hafen h e r e f o r a l l

intents

and p u r p o s e s and t h a t W e l l s ' a c t i o n s v i s - a - v i s A p p e l l a n t M a r t i n
c o n s t i t u t e d e n t r a p m e n t as a m a t t e r of law.
CONCLUSIONBased on t h e f o r e g o i n g , A p p e l l a n t r e q u e s t s t h i s
t o r e v e r s e t h e Minute E n t r y d e c i s i o n of t h e lower c o u r t ,

Court
dated

A p r i l 2 7 , 1984, as w e l l as t h e J u r y V e r d i c t and t o r u l e as a
m a t t e r of t h e f a c t s h e r e and t h e Utah law of entrapment

that

A p p e l l a n t was e n t r a p p e d and, t h e r e f o r e , ought t o be a c q u i t t e d
of t h e crime c h a r g e d .
DATED t h i s J ? t y ^ d a y of May, 1985.
Respectfully

orney for

submitted,

Defendant/Appellant

HAROLD L. WHITNEY
/
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Gait Lcko C o w * ' Utah
GALEN ROSS
Attorney for Defendant
1303 Wasatch Drive
Salt Lake City UT 84108
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H. Dixffi Kndley, C.c;\^rJ Dist..Cour
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF HEARING OF
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELY
ON DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT

Plantiff,
vs.
JERRY L. MARTIN

Case No. CR 83-809

Defendant

TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the above entitled matter
will come on regularly for hearing on the 27th day of April, 1984, at the
hour of 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, ^Judge, Third District
Court.

Please govern yourselves accordingly.

DATED this jC?

day of April, 1984.

*-<Ic

^

Galen Ross

^ —

Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Notice to Paul Payden of the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourt South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111, this /&

day of April, 1984.
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H. Dixao
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Hindtv. Ci«rk 3rd CMst. Court

In the District Court ol the Third Judicial District u
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

o«putycierk

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff
V*.
JERRY L .

MARTIN

VERDICT

and

SUSAN ARMIJO,r

Caae No.

CR

83-809

Defendant

fe, tbe Jurors iapaneled ia the above case, fis* .„.ii^-.^l^l a .. n l.<._
Jerry L. Martin, Guilty of Unlawful Distribution For Value of
a Controlled Substance as charged in the Information.

Dated JJML

3A
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the Utah
State Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this

£ffi

day of May, 19 85

2&2J**=r^

X T HANSEN
Attorney for Appellant

